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Abstract. We estimate the maximum amount that Danish households are willing to 
pay for three different types of insurance: auto, home and house insurance. We use a 
unique combination of claims data from the largest private insurance company in 
Denmark, measures of individual risk attitudes and discount rates from a field 
experiment with a representative sample of the adult Danish population, and 
information on household income and wealth from registers at Statistics Denmark. 
We assume that households maximize expected inter-temporal utility subject to an 
inter-temporal budget constraint with several possible states of nature, where all 
uncertainty is realized in the initial period and any loss incurred by an accident is 
subtracted from initial wealth. The estimated willingness to pay is based on annual 
claims and should thus be considered as an annual premium. Since there is some 
uncertainty about the estimates of risk attitudes and discount rates, there is some 
uncertainty about the estimated willingness to pay. We use a randomized factorial 
design in our sensitivity analysis where each simulation involves a random draw from 
independent normal distributions of the estimated risk and time preferences. The 
results show that the willingness to pay is marginally higher than the actuarial fair 
value under Expected Utility Theory. However, the estimated willingness to pay is 
significantly higher under Rank-Dependent Utility Theory, and for some households 
it may be up to 600% higher than the actuarial value of the insurance claims.  
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There is no simple way to measure the economic value of insurance products because the primary 
use of these products deals with the control of risk. Some studies attempt to estimate the willingness 
to pay for insurance products using contingent valuation or stated choice methods that are based on 
hypothetical questions, while other studies attempt to estimate risk preferences from data on 
insurance claims and deductible choices (Einav and Cohen [2007]).1 Contingent valuation and stated 
choice methods are based on survey questions with no real purchase or consumption consequences 
for the participants. These methods may thus attract a “hypothetical bias,” which measured as the 
divergence between the real and hypothetical willingness to pay. There is widespread evidence of 
participants in contingent valuation studies to overstate the amount they are willing to pay for an 
incremental unit of private goods (Cummings, Harrison and Rutstrom [1995]; List and Gallet [2001]; 
Murphy, Allen, Stevens and Weatherhead [2005], and Blumenschein et al. [2008]. 
We estimate the willingness to pay among Danish households for three types of insurance 
using a unique combination of claims data from the largest Danish insurance company, Tryg A/S, 
register based data from Statistics Denmark, and measures of individual risk attitudes and discount 
rates from a field experiment with a representative sample of the adult Danish population. These 
field experiments were carried out under the auspices of the Danish Ministry of Economic and 
Business Affairs, and the incentives in these experiments are comparable to the average claims on 
auto, home and house insurance products that we consider in this study.  
 The estimated willingness to pay for insurance is based on a decision problem in which the 
decision maker maximizes expected inter-temporal utility subject to an inter-temporal budget 
constraint. The model is calibrated to claims data in 2004 from the customer database at Tryg A/S, 
and this data is mapped to information at Statistics Denmark on annual household income and 
financial wealth. Since potential insurance claims may be substantial in comparison to annual income, 
and the probability of filing a claim is relatively small, it is appropriate to allow for consumption 
smoothing over a longer time period and thereby reduce the impact of an accident on consumption 
in the short term.  
 We use experimental data from a field methodology developed by Harrison, Lau, Rutström 
and Sullivan [2005] to elicit both risk and time preferences from the same respondents. The 
experimental procedures build on the risk aversion experiments of Holt and Laury [2002] and the 
                                                 
1 See Harrison and Martinez-Correa [2012] for a systematic overview of the literature on behavioural insurance.  
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discount rate experiments of Coller and Williams [1999] and Harrison, Lau and Williams [2002]. Data 
is collected in the field in Denmark in June 2003, to obtain a sample that offers a wider range of 
individual socio-demographic characteristics than usually found in subject pools recruited in colleges, 
as well as a sample that can be used to make inferences about the preferences of the adult population 
of Denmark. These experiments are “artefactual field experiments” in the terminology of Harrison 
and List [2004], since lab experiments are essentially taken to field subjects. Economists recognize 
that preferences can differ across individuals, but only a few attempts have been made to elicit 
individual preferences for representative samples of a population in a particular geographical area, 
region or country.2  
 We discuss the elicitation of risk and time preferences in Section 1, and the estimation of 
these preferences in Section 2. The demand for insurance is discussed in Section 3, along with a 
presentation of the claims data in Section 4, and the estimated willingness to pay for auto, home and 
house insurance in Section 5. We consider the effects of alternative probability weighting functions 
on estimated WTP in Section 6, and conclude in Section 7.  
 
1. Eliciting Risk and Time Preferences 
 Information on individual risk attitudes and discount rates is obtained from Harrison, Lau, 
Rutström and Sullivan [2005]. The sample for the field experiments was designed to generate a 
representative sample of the adult Danish population between 19 and 75 years of age. A total of 664 
invitations were mailed out to a stratified sample of the adult population. Everyone who gave a 
positive response was assigned to a session, and the recruited sample was 268, corresponding to a 
response rate of 40%. The experiments were conducted in June 2003, and a final sample of 253 
subjects provided data.  
 
 
                                                 
2 Harrison, Lau and Williams [2002] elicit individual discount rates for a representative sample of the adult Danish 
population and find evidence of significant preference heterogeneity across socio-demographic variables. This is the first 
attempt to elicit individual preferences of a population in a country using controlled experiments with monetary rewards. 
Eckel, Johnson and Montmarquette [2005] conduct a field study of time and risk preferences. Their subjects are recruited 
from low income neighborhoods in Montreal, and they are given 64 “compensated” questions, one of which is chosen at 
random for payment. Dohmen et al. [2005] elicit individual risk attitudes and combine hypothetical surveys with 
experiments that involve monetary incentives. A total of 450 subjects participated in the experiment, and they were 
recruited from 179 randomly chosen voting districts in Germany. Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutström [2010] examine 
the strengths and weaknesses of laboratory and field experiments to detect differences in preferences over risk and time 
that are associated with standard, observable characteristics of the individual. 
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 A. Risk Preferences: Measuring Risk Aversion 
 Harrison, Lau, Rutström and Sullivan [2005] used a multiple price list (MPL) design to elicit 
individual risk attitudes.3 They use the same approach as in Holt and Laury [2002] and presented an 
ordered array of binary lottery choices to be made at once. The subject picked one of the two 
lotteries in each row of the MPL, played out the chosen lottery and received the reward. Each 
subject responded to four separate risk aversion tasks, each with different prizes designed so that all 
16 prizes span an income interval from 50 kroner to 4500 kroner.4 One task and one row were 
picked at random for payment, and each subject was given a 10% chance to actually receive the 
payment associated with his or her decision.5 
 We take each of the binary choices of the subject as the data, and estimate the parameters of 
a latent utility function that explains those choices using an appropriate error structure to account for 
the panel nature of the data. The data set consists of observations from 253 subjects, with 7,928 risk 
aversion choices.6 Once the utility function is defined, for a candidate value of the parameters of that 
function, we can construct the expected utility of the two gambles, and then use a linking function to 
infer the likelihood of the observed choice.  
 
 B. Time Preferences: Measuring Individual Discount Rates  
 Individual discount rates (IDRs) were elicited by an experimental design that was introduced 
in Coller and Williams [1999] and expanded in Harrison, Lau and Williams [2002]. Each subjects in 
Harrison, Lau, Rutström and Sullivan [2005] was presented with 6 discount rate tasks with 6 
different time horizons: 1 month, 4 months, 6 months, 12 months, 18 months, and 24 months. In 
each task subjects were provided two future income options rather than one “instant income” option 
                                                 
3 Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutström [2006] examine the properties of the MPL procedure in detail, and the older 
literature using it. Harrison and Rutström [2008] evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of alternative elicitation 
procedures for risk attitudes. 
4 The four sets of prizes were as follows, with the two prizes for lottery A listed first and the two prizes for lottery B 
listed next: (A1: 2000 kroner, 1600 kroner; B1: 3850 kroner, 100 kroner), (A2: 2250 kroner, 1500 kroner; B2: 4000 
kroner, 500 kroner), (A3: 2000 kroner, 1750 kroner; B3: 4000 kroner, 150 kroner), and (A4: 2500 kroner, 1000 kroner; 
B4: 4500 kroner, 50 kroner). At the time of the experiments, the exchange rate was approximately 6.55 kroner per U.S. 
dollar, so these prizes range from approximately $7.65 to $687. 
5 There is considerable behavioral evidence that rewarding subjects by selecting one task at random for payment does not 
distort choices, even though it does make the overall experiment a compound lottery. See Harrison, Lau and Rutström 
[2007; fn.16] for evidence on this issue for the risk aversion instrument we used here, and Harrison and Rutström [2008; 
§2.6] for similar evidence in comparable lottery choice tasks. 
6 Some subjects received a different number of choices than others. For example, 116 subjects received a “symmetric” 
risk aversion task involving 40 choices (hence there were 116×40 = 4,640 choices) and the remaining 137 subjects 
received an “asymmetric” risk aversion task involving 24 choices (hence there were 137×24 = 3,288 choices). 
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and one future income option. The early income option was 3,000 kroner and delayed by one month 
in all tasks. For example, they were offered 3,000 kroner in one month and 3,000 kroner + x kroner 
in 7 months, so that we interpret the revealed discount rate as applying to a time horizon of 6 
months. This avoids the potential problem of the subject facing extra risk or transactions costs with 
the future income option, as compared to the “instant” income option.7  
 Each subject responded to all six discount rate tasks and one task and row were chosen at 
random for payment. Future payments to subjects were guaranteed by the Danish Ministry of 
Economic and Business Affairs, and made by automatic transfer from the Ministry’s bank account to 
the subject’s bank account. This payment procedure is similar to a post-dated check, and automatic 
transfers between bank accounts are a common procedure in Denmark. Finally, each subject was 
given a 10% chance to receive actual payment. Thus, each subject faced a 10% chance of receiving 
payment in the risk preference task as well as a 10% chance in the time preference task. 
 Our estimation strategy is the same as for the lottery task. We take each of the binary choices 
of the subject as data, and estimate the parameters with an error structure that recognizes the panel 
nature of the data. The data set consists of 15,180 discount rate choices.  
 
2. Identifying Risk and Time Preferences 
A. Estimation of Risk Attitudes 
We begin with Expected Utility Theory (EUT) as a model for the choices over risky options 
and let the utility function be the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) specification 
U(M) = (ω+M)(1−r)/(1−r) (1) 
for r≠1, where r is the CRRA coefficient and ω is background consumption. With this functional 
form, r=0 denotes risk neutral behavior, r>0 denotes risk aversion, and r<0 denotes risk loving 
behavior.8 
                                                 
7 These transactions costs are discussed in Coller and Williams [1999], and they include simple things such as 
remembering to pick up the delayed payment as well as more complex things such as the credibility of the money actually 
being paid in the future. The payment protocol in the experiment was intended to make sure that the credibility of 
receiving the money in the future was high.  
8 There is evidence from the lab and field that subjects are risk averse over stakes ranging between pennies and several 
hundred dollars. Holt and Laury [2002][2005] produced the most widely cited evidence from the lab, and they show that 
subjects are moderately averse to risk. Harrison, Lau and Rutström [2007] find comparable results using data from the 
Danish field experiments that we also apply in our analysis. The literature offers some evidence of lower estimates of 
relative risk aversion when the stakes in the experimental task are reduced significantly, which may cause one to question 
our use of the restrictive CRRA function. However, Harrison, Lau and Rutström [2007] find that CRRA holds locally 
over the domain of stakes in the Danish experiments, and we therefore adopt this popular specification. 
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 We can write out the likelihood function for the choices that the subjects made and estimate 
the risk parameter r.9 Probabilities for each outcome Mj, pj(Mj), are those that are induced by the 
experimenter, so expected utility is simply the probability weighted utility of each outcome in each 
lottery. Since there were two outcomes in each lottery, the EU for lottery i is 
EUi = ∑j=1, J [ pj(Mj) × U(ω+Mj) ]. (2) 
 Conditional on EUT and CRRA specifications being true the likelihood of the risk aversion 
responses depends on the estimates of r and the observed choices. We follow Andersen, Harrison, 
Lau and Rutström [2008a] and assume that income from the risk aversion and discount rate tasks is 
integrated with daily background consumption, which was equal to 118 kroner for the average Dane 
in 2003. We use this value of ω in our estimations.  
 Table 1 displays the results from maximum likelihood estimation of elicited risk attitudes. 
The results show that the average Dane is risk averse with a CRRA coefficient of 0.73 and a standard 
error of 0.045. This coefficient is significantly different from 0 and marginally higher than the 
estimate of 0.67 which is reported in Harrison, Lau and Rutström [2007] for the same data set but 
with background consumption ω=0.  
We also report total effects of key demographic variables, i.e. we condition the CRRA 
coefficient on one demographic characteristic at a time. The coefficients from the maximum 
likelihood estimations are displayed in Table 1 and show some variation in risk attitudes across the 
demographic characteristics. Women are more risk averse than men. The CRRA coefficient is 0.76 
for women and 0.69 for men, and the difference of 0.07 is statistically significant with a p-value of 
0.016. We find some variation across age groups, but there is no general tendency for younger age 
groups to be more or less risk averse than older age groups. Finally, we do not observe significant 
differences in risk attitudes between singles and those who live with a spouse or partner.10  
                                                 
9 The statistical specification allows for the possibility of correlation between responses by the same subject. The use of 
clustering to allow for “panel effects” from unobserved individual effects is common in the statistical survey literature. 
Clustering commonly arises in national field surveys from the fact that physically proximate households are often 
sampled to save time and money, but it can also arise from more homely sampling procedures. For example, Williams 
[2000; p.645] notes that it could arise from dental studies that “collect data on each tooth surface for each of several teeth 
from a set of patients” or “repeated measurements or recurrent events observed on the same person.” The procedures 
for allowing for clustering allow heteroskedasticity between and within clusters, as well as autocorrelation within clusters. 
They are closely related to the “generalized estimating equations” approach to panel estimation in epidemiology (see 
Liang and Zeger [1986]), and generalize the “robust standard errors” approach popular in econometrics (see Rogers 
[1993]). Wooldridge [2003] reviews some issues in the use of clustering for panel effects, in particular noting that 
significant inferential problems may arise with small numbers of panels. 
10 Harrison, Lau and Rutstrom [2007] find evidence of sample selection into the experiment, and the mean estimate of 
relative risk aversion is reduced by this correction. However, the marginal effects of individual characteristics are similar 
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 B. Rank-Dependent Utility Theory 
 One route of departure from EUT has been to allow preferences to depend on the rank of 
the final outcome through probability weighting. The idea that one could use non-linear 
transformations of the probabilities of a lottery when weighting outcomes, instead of non-linear 
transformations of the outcome into utility, was most sharply presented by Yaari [1987]. To illustrate 
the point, he assumed a linear utility function, in effect ruling out any risk aversion or risk seeking 
from the shape of the utility function. Instead, concave (convex) probability weighting functions 
imply risk seeking (risk aversion). It is possible for a decision maker to have a probability weighting 
function with both concave and convex components, and the conventional wisdom is that the 
function is concave for smaller probabilities and convex for larger probabilities. 
 Quiggin [1982] formally presented the general case of rank-dependent preferences for choice 
over lotteries in which one allowed for subjective probability weighting and non-linear utility 
functions. This model has become known as Rank-Dependent Utility (RDU). The Yaari [1987] 
model can be seen as an important special case, and can be called the Rank-Dependent Expected 
Value model.  
 Formally, to calculate decision weights under RDU one replaces expected utility in equation 
(2) with RDU 
RDUi = ∑j=1, J [ wj × uj ] (3) 
where 
wj = ω(pj + ... + pn) − ω(pj+1 + ... + pn) (4) 
for j=1,... , n−1, and wj = ω(pj) for j=n. The subscript indicates outcomes ranked from worst to best, 
and where ω(p) is some probability weighting function.  
 Picking the right probability weighting function is obviously important for the RDU 
specification. A weighting function proposed by Tversky and Kahneman [1992] has been widely 
used. It is assumed to have well-behaved endpoints such that ω(0)=0 and ω(1)=1 and is given by 
ω(p) = pγ/[ pγ + (1−p)γ ]1/γ (5) 
for 0<p<1. The normal assumption, backed by a substantial amount of evidence reviewed by 
Gonzalez and Wu [1999], is that 0<γ<1. This gives the weighting function an “inverse S-shape,” 
characterized by a concave section signifying the overweighting of small probabilities up to a 
crossover-point where ω(p)=p, beyond which there is a convex section signifying underweighting. 
                                                                                                                                                              
across specifications with and without correction for sample selection.  
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Under the RDU assumption about how these probability weights get converted into decision weights, 
γ<1 implies overweighting of extreme outcomes. Thus the probability associated with an outcome 
does not directly inform one about the decision weight of that outcome. If γ>1 the function takes 
the less conventional “S-shape,” with convexity for smaller probabilities and concavity for larger 
probabilities. Under RDU γ>1 implies underweighting of extreme outcomes.  
 We again assume the CRRA functional form for utility. The parameter r determines the 
concavity of the utility function but is no longer the sole determinant of risk attitudes since 
probabilities are also transformed. The remainder of the econometric specification is the same as for 
the EUT model.  
The effects of allowing for probability weighting are displayed in Table 2, and we find some 
evidence of probability weighting. The mean estimate of γ for the entire sample is 0.61 with a 
standard error of 0.041. The hypothesis that γ=1, that there is no probability weighting, has a p-value 
of less than 0.001 using a Wald test. The estimate of the curvature of the utility function, given by 
the CRRA coefficient, is smaller than the estimate of that parameter under EUT in the comparable 
specification. The effect of allowing for probability weighting is therefore to reduce estimates of the 
curvature of the utility function – we should be careful here not to conceptually associate curvature of 
the utility function with risk aversion. 
Figure 1 displays the probability weighting function and decision weights assuming a value of 
γ = 0.61. For illustrative purposes, the decision weights are shown for a lottery with five outcomes 
using values of p = 0.90 for the no-claims category and p = 0.025 for each of the four other 
categories with positive insurance claims. The rank-dependent specification assigns a weight of 71.2 
% to the no-claims category, a weight of 3.6% to the second-best outcome, 4.5% to the third-best 
outcome, 6.2% to the fourth-best outcome, and a weight 14.5% to the worst outcome. Hence, we 
see that the decision weight is reduced significantly for the best outcome and increased for all other 
outcomes, with a dramatic increase from 2.5% to 14.5% for the worst outcome. These biases in the 
decision weights have significant effects on the estimated willingness to pay for the three insurance 
products. 
The results in Table 2 show some variation in probability weighting across the demographic 
characteristics. Subjects between 30 and 40 years of age do not have a systematic bias in their 
perception of probabilities and the γ-parameter for this age group is 1.01 with a standard error of 
0.130. The γ-parameter is less than 1 for all other demographic characteristics, and we can reject the 
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hypothesis of no probability weighting at conventional statistical significance levels for each of these 
demographic variables. We also find more variation in the CRRA coefficients compared to the EUT 
model. There is no longer a significant difference in risk attitudes between men and women. 
However, we now find that people younger than 30 years of age are significantly more risk averse 
than people older than 40 years of age.  
 
C. Estimation of Discount Rates 
 Consider next the joint estimation of risk and time preferences. Our statistical specification 
relies on a special case of the model in Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutström [2008a], which is 
based on the dual-self representation of latent risk and time preferences by Fudenberg and Levine 
[2006]. We assume that income earned from the risk and the discount rate tasks is integrated with the 
same level of daily background consumption.  
Specifically, if we assume that Expected Utility Theory (EUT) holds for the choices over 
risky alternatives and that discounting is exponential then the subject is indifferent between two 
income options Mt and Mt+τ if and only if 
U(ω+Mt) + (1/(1+δ)τ) U(ω) = U(ω) + (1/(1+δ)τ) U(ω+Mt+τ) (6) 
where U(ω+Mt) is the utility of monetary outcome Mt for delivery at time t plus some measure of 
background consumption ω, δ is the discount rate, τ is the horizon for delivery of the later monetary 
outcome at time t+τ, and the utility function U is separable and stationary over time.11 The left hand 
side of equation (1) is the sum of the discounted utilities of receiving the monetary outcome Mt at 
time t (in addition to background consumption) and receiving nothing extra at time t+τ, and the 
right hand side is the sum of the discounted utilities of receiving nothing over background 
consumption at time t and the outcome Mt+τ (plus background consumption) at time t+τ. Thus (8) is 
an indifference condition and δ is the discount rate that equalizes the present value of the utility of 
the two monetary outcomes Mt and Mt+τ, after integration with an appropriate level of background 
consumption ω. 
We can write out the likelihood function for the choices that our subjects made and estimate 
the risk parameter r and the discount rate δ. Instead of specifying the expected utility of option A 
                                                 
11 Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutström [2008b] use panel data from these Danish experiments and find some variation 
in risk attitudes over time, but there is no general tendency for risk aversion to increase or decrease over the 17-months 
time span that they consider.   
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and B, equation (2) is replaced by the discounted utility of each of the two options, conditional on 
some assumed discount rate.  
 Table 3 displays the results from joint maximum likelihood estimation of elicited discount 
rates and risk attitudes. The results show that the average Dane has an estimated discount rate of 
10.1% with a standard error of 0.85%. This estimate is similar to the reported value in Andersen, 
Harrison, Lau and Rutström [2008a]. We find a small and insignificant difference in discount rates 
between men and women. Men have a discount rate of 10.3% and the estimated coefficient for 
women is 9.9%. The results indicate a systematic variation in discount rates across age groups, and 
we find that younger people have lower discount rates than older people. Discount rates vary 
between 9.0% for people younger than 30 years of age to 12.1% for those older than 60 years of age. 
Finally, there is some variation in discount rates between singles and those living with a partner or 
spouse.  
 The mean estimate of the CRRA coefficient is the same as before, but we find less variation 
in the estimated coefficients across demographic variables compared to the values reported in Table 
1. For example, the difference in risk aversion between men and women is smaller and no longer 
statistically significant.  
 
3. Estimating Willingness to Pay 
 We assume that households maximize expected inter-temporal utility subject to an inter-
temporal budget constraint with several possible states of nature, where all uncertainty is realized in 
the initial period and any loss incurred by an accident is subtracted from initial wealth. Since potential 
insurance claims may be substantial in comparison to annual income, it is appropriate to allow for 
consumption smoothing over time and thereby cushion the impact of an accident on consumption 
in the short term.  
 
 A. Model 
We first present the model without uncertainty to illustrate the inter-temporal optimization 
problem over a finite time period T, and then introduce uncertainty to estimate the willingness to pay 
for each insurance type.  
The inter-temporal utility function at time t = 0 of the representative household is given by 
U = ∑{t=0,… T−1} (1+δ)−t u(ct) (7) 
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where ct is consumption in period t. The instantaneous utility function 
u(ct) = (ct)(1
−r)/(1−r) (8) 
is stationary and similar to the CRRA specification in (1). The dynamic budget constraint is 
Wt+1 = (1+i)(Wt + yt − ct) (9) 
where i is the (constant) real interest rate, Wt is financial wealth in period t, and yt is income in period 
t. Financial wealth in the terminal period cannot be negative and is specified as a fraction α of initial 
wealth WT = α W0, with α ≥ 0.12 The inter-temporal budget constraint is derived from the dynamic 
budget constraint (9) and the terminal constraint, and is written as 
∑{t=0,… T−1} (1+i)−t ct = ∑{t=0,… T−1} (1+i)−t yt + (1−α(1+i)−T) W0 (10) 
This constraint implies that the net present value of inter-temporal consumption is equal to the net 
present value of inter-temporal income plus initial financial wealth minus the net present value of 
financial wealth in the final period.  
Maximizing inter-temporal utility subject to the inter-temporal budget constraint gives the 
Euler equation, which specifies the optimal consumption profile over the finite time horizon 
ct+1 = ((1+i)/(1+δ))1/r ct (11) 
where 1/r is the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution. We can then derive consumption in period t 
as a function of consumption in the initial period and insert the expression into the inter-temporal 
budget constraint to find the optimal level of consumption in the initial period 
c0 = M · ( ∑{t=1,… T−1} (1+i)−t yt + (1−α(1+i)−T) W0 ) (12) 
with 
M = 1/∑{t=1,… T−1} (1+i)−t ((1+i)/(1+δ))t/r. (13) 
Hence, consumption in the initial period is determined by a multiplier times the present value of 
lifetime income minus net savings from the initial to the final period. The optimal level of 
consumption over time (c*t) is then derived by inserting equation (12) into equation (11). The 
multiplier in equation (13) is a function of the real interest rate and the individual discount rate, and 
we see that a higher discount rate puts more weight on present consumption by increasing the 
multiplier in equation (13), and less weight on future consumption by reducing the growth rate in 
equation (11). A higher interest rate reduces the present value of lifetime income and has a negative 
                                                 
12 Strictly speaking, α should be endogenous in the model because households decide how much wealth to hold in period 
T. However, one would need a bequest or precautionary savings motive to obtain a positive level of wealth in the final 
period. Adding these motives would make it more complicated to estimate the willingness to pay. We vary the value of α 
in the sensitivity analysis and find that the willingness to pay is robust to variations in the value of this parameter.  
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income effect on consumption in the present and in the future. However, a higher interest rate 
reduces the price of future consumption relative to present consumption, and the substitution effect 
dominates the income effect if the intertemporal elasticity of consumption (1/r) is greater than 1, 
that is, if r < 1.  
 We now add uncertainty to the decision problem in order to calculate willingness to pay for 
insurance under assumptions of symmetric information and no default risk for the insurer. The 
representative household can end up in five possible states (s = 1,..., 5), which correspond to each of 
the five claims categories that are presented in Section 4. Expected inter-temporal utility is given by  
EU = ∑{s=1,…, 5} ps ∑{t=0,…, T−} (1+δ)−t u(c*s, t) (14) 
where ps is the probability of ending up in state s, and c*s, t is the optimal level of consumption in 
state s at time t. The decision weights are revised under rank-dependent utility theory, which allows 
for subjective probability weighting.  
 We assume that all uncertainty is realized in the initial period, and any loss incurred by an 
accident is subtracted from initial wealth 
Ws, 0 = W0 − Ls (15) 
where Ws, 0 is wealth in the initial period after realization of loss L in state s. The willingness to pay 
for insurance is then defined as the certain reduction in initial wealth that makes the household 
indifferent between paying this insurance premium and entering a lottery with five possible 
outcomes. The estimated willingness to pay is based on annual claims and should thus be considered 
as the annual premium that the household is willing to pay for insurance.  
 To estimate the willingness to pay for insurance we consider the optimal level of expected 
inter-temporal utility with and without insurance  
U = ∑{t=0,… T−1} (1+δ)−t u(c*t) = EU (16) 
where c*t is the optimal level of consumption at time t with insurance. Inserting the Euler equation 
(11) into (16) gives the following expression 
c*0 = (M · EU (1−r))1/(1−r)  (17) 
Finally, we can derive the maximum insurance premium P that the household is willing to pay by 
inserting equation (12) into (17), assuming the premium is paid in the initial period 
P = ∑{t=1,… T−1} (1+i)−t yt + (1−α(1+i)−T) W0 – Mr/(1−r) (EU (1−r))1/(1−r) (18) 
We thus need information on insurance claims, financial wealth, annual income, market interest 
rates, risk attitudes, and discount rates. We have access to this information in Denmark, although we 
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cannot map the information on risk attitudes and discount rates and risk attitudes to the claims data 
from Tryg A/S and income and wealth data from Statistics Denmark. Since there is some uncertainty 
about the estimates of risk attitudes and discount rates, there is some uncertainty about the estimated 
willingness to pay. We use a randomized factorial design in our sensitivity analysis where each 
simulation involves a random draw from independent normal distributions of the estimated risk and 
time preferences.  
 
4. Insurance Data 
 The insurance data set is kindly provided by the largest Danish general insurance company, 
Tryg A/S, with a market share slightly above 20 per cent. The data transfer is approved by the 
Danish Financial Supervisory Authority and the Danish Data Protection Agency. The data set 
contains 1,004,032 observations from customers who bought an auto, home or house insurance 
policy in 2004. We have information on insurance claims data, and use personal ID numbers to map 
this information with data from registers at Statistics Denmark to obtain information on annual 
income and financial wealth at the level of the individual and the household. The insurance policies 
cover the entire household, which we consider as the unit of analysis in our estimations of the 
willingness to pay for insurance.13  
For each type of insurance policy we divide the households into five claims categories: (1) 
those with no insurance claim, (2) those with an insurance claim of 1-5,000 kroner, (3) those with a 
claim of 5,001-15,000 kroner, (4) those with a claim of 15,001-50,000 kroner, and finally (5) 
customers with a claim of 50,001 kroner or more. This gives us a discrete distribution of claims for 
each type of insurance.14  
 Figure 2 displays the distribution of auto insurance claims for single men, single women and 
couples. We have 326,426 observations on auto insurance claims in 2004, and omit the no-claims 
category in the figure. The probability of filing an auto insurance claim in 2004 was 9 percent for 
                                                 
13 We map the estimates of individual risk and time preferences to the household insurance data using equal weights for 
the individual characteristics. Hence, we use a weight of 1/3 for the estimates on age, sex and marital status, respectively. 
For example, in the case of single men between 30 and 40 years of age, the mapping is 1/3 times the estimate for males 
plus 1/3 times the estimate for the age group between 30 and 40 years of age plus 1/3 times the estimate for singles. In 
the case of couples, the first term is replaced by 1/6 times the estimate for men and 1/6 times the estimate for women 
(assuming heterosexual relationships).  
14 The premium for most insurance policies in Denmark is paid on a yearly basis. In the few cases where households have 
filed more than one insurance claim in 2004, these claims have been pooled into a single total claim to reflect the total 
repayment over the year. In this way the computed willingness to pay is comparable to the insurance premiums actually 
paid in 2004.  
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single men, 10 percent for single women and 13 percent for couples. We observe that couples have a 
higher risk of filing an auto insurance claim than single men and women, respectively. This is 
presumably because many couples own one car only and drive more combined compared to single 
men and women. We also find that single men have a marginally higher probability of filing an auto 
insurance claim of more than 50,000 kroner compared to single women and couples.  
 The data set contains 444,748 observations on home insurance, and the distribution of claims 
that were filed in 2004 is displayed in Figure 3. Most insurance claims are relatively small and fall in 
the interval of 1-5,000 kroner, and couples are more likely to file a home insurance claim in that 
interval compared to single men and women. The probability of filing a home insurance claim was 8 
percent for both single men and women and 12 percent for couples. 
 Finally, we have 232,858 observations on house insurance claims in 2004. Figure 4 shows 
that couples are more likely to file a house insurance claim than single men and women, like the two 
other types of insurance. The probability of filing a claim is marginally lower for single men and 
women compared to couples in each claims category, which is the general pattern we see across all 
insurance types and claims categories. The probability of filing a house insurance claim in 2004 was 9 
percent for single men, 11 percent for single women and 13 percent for couples.   
 
5. WTP for Auto, Home and House Insurance 
 The model is calibrated to the claims data from the customer database at Tryg A/S and 
information on annual income after tax and private financial wealth from Statistics Denmark.15 
Households are divided into five age categories, and we generally observe an inverse U-shape of 
income after tax and an increasing level of financial wealth as the customers get older.16 We calculate 
how much each household is willing to pay for insurance using estimates of relative risk aversion and 
discount rates from the Danish field experiments. The insurance claims may be substantial relative to 
annual income, and we assume that households have a 10-year planning horizon and choose the 
optimal consumption profile over this timespan. Annual income is constant in the estimations and 
net savings over the 10-year time period is set to zero, and we use a market interest rate of 4% in the 
                                                 
15 We use GAMS to estimate the WTP for insurance products. The programs and aggregate data are available from the 
authors on request. However, due to confidentiality issues we are not permitted to pass on insurance data at the 
household level to third parties. 
16 Age groups are assigned to the oldest member of the household. Table A1 and A2 in the Appendix (which is available 
upon request) shows the distribution of after-tax income and financial wealth for those men, women and couples who 
purchased auto, home and auto insurance at Tryg A/S in 2004. 
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baseline calculations.17  
  
 A. Auto Insurance 
 Panel A in Table 4 displays the average annual auto insurance claims for men, women and 
couples across different age groups. There are substantial differences in these insurance claims across 
households. Single men younger than 30 years of age have an average auto insurance claim of 3,197 
kroner per annum, which is twice as high as the average insurance claim for single women in the 
same age group, and marginally higher than the average insurance claim for couples. Average annual 
insurance claims fall with age and there is only a marginal difference in insurance claims between 
single men and women who are older than 60 years of age (1,153 kroner for men and 1,137 kroner 
for women).  
 Panel B shows the estimated annual willingness to pay for auto insurance assuming EUT. 
Since there is some uncertainty about the estimates of risk attitudes and discount rates, there is some 
uncertainty about the estimated willingness to pay. We use a randomized factorial design in our 
sensitivity analysis and undertake 10,000 perturbations (Harrison and Vinod, [1992]). Each 
simulation involves a random draw from independent normal distributions of the CRRA parameter 
and the individual discount rate for each type of household. We report the mean values and standard 
deviations of these simulations, and the results show that the willingness to pay is marginally higher 
than the average insurance claims for the various household types. For example, the willingness to 
pay for men younger than 30 years of age is 3,307 kroner compared to the average insurance claim of 
3,197 kroner, which gives a difference of 110 kroner. The standard deviation of the estimated WTP 
is small and less than 5 kroner across all types of households. Hence, there is little variation in the 
estimated WTP when we consider the uncertainty of the elicited risk attitudes and discount rates and 
assume that the households behave according to EUT.  
This pattern is different when we look at the willingness to pay under RDU. Panel C in Table 
4 shows that the willingness to pay for auto insurance increases significantly when we allow for 
probability weighting and adjust the weights for each category of claims. For example, the mean 
estimate of the willingness to pay for men younger than 30 years of age is 14,766 kroner with the 
rank-dependent specification, which is significantly higher than the mean estimate of 3,303 kroner 
                                                 
17 These assumptions imply that the present discounted value of consumption is equal to the present discounted value of 
income over the 10-year time period, and the consumption profile is declining over time because i<δ. We do not find 
significant differences in the estimated willingness to pay when the market interest rate is increased to 10%.   
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under EUT. We also observe that the standard deviation of the estimated WTP increases 
considerably and is 1,597 kroner for men younger than 30 years of age. These effects are similar for 
other types of households, and we find that the estimated WTP increases between 300% and 600% 
for the RDU specification compared to the EUT assumption.  
 
 B. Home Insurance 
We next present the results for the home insurance product. Table 5 shows that the average 
home insurance claims vary between 358 kroner for women older than 60 years of age to 1,257 
kroner for couples younger than 30 years of age. These average claims are lower than those for auto 
insurance. This is not because the risk of filing a home insurance claim is lower than the risk of 
having a car accident, but the claims are generally lower for home insurance. The estimated WTP for 
home insurance is marginally higher than the average insurance claims for all types of household 
using the EUT specification, and we find again a significant increase in the estimated WTP for the 
rank-dependent specification compared to the EUT assumption. For example, the estimated WTP 
for home insurance is 3,186 kroner for women older than 60 years, which is nine times higher than 
the mean estimate of 352 kroner under the EUT assumption.  
 
 C. House Insurance 
 Finally, we present the results for house insurance. Table 6 shows the expected claims and 
WTP for this type of insurance. We find that the average claims vary between 888 kroner for men 
older than 60 years of age to 2,680 kroner for couples between 30 and 40 years of age. Couples have 
higher claims than single men and women, and the likely reason is that they have larger homes than 
single men and women. The results show that the risk premium is small under the EUT specification 
and it increases significantly under the RDU specification.  
 
D. Sensitivity Analysis 
To examine how sensitive the estimates are to our choice of parameters, we also vary the 
planning horizon, the level of net savings over this horizon, and the market interest rate.18 We find 
that the estimated WTP increases generally when the planning horizon is reduced. For example, the 
willingness to pay for auto insurance for men younger than 30 years of age increases from 3,303 
                                                 
18 The estimates are displayed in Table A3 for the EUT model and Table A4 for the RDU model. 
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kroner to 5,539 kroner when the time horizon is reduced from 10 years to 1 year, using the EUT 
specification. The results are similar for the RDU specification when we reduce the time horizon. A 
shorter planning horizon reduces the present value of income, and the insurance claims will 
therefore have a greater relative impact on income. The greater variation in income leads to an 
increase in the estimated WTP for all three types of insurance.  
There is no significant effect on the estimated WTP when financial wealth in the final period 
is equal to 0. We observe only a marginal reduction in estimated WTP compared to the model where 
net savings is zero. The results also suggest that the level of the market interest rate has a marginal 
effect on the estimated WTP, and increasing the market rate to 10% raises the estimates for the three 
insurance produces across all types of households. The results thus show that the estimated WTP for 
insurance is sensitive to the time horizon, but is robust to changes in market interest rate and net 
savings over the time horizon.  
 
6. Probability Weighting 
 The results indicate that the effects of risk aversion under expected utility theory on the 
willingness to pay for insurance are rather small, whereas the assumption of rank-dependent 
expected utility may have a substantial effect on estimated WTP for the three types of insurance. 
There are some well-known limitations of the Tversky-Kahneman probability weighting function in 
equation (5). It does not allow independent specification of location and curvature; it has a 
crossover-point at p=1/e=0.37 for γ<1 and at p=1−0.37=0.63 for γ>1; and it is not increasing in p 
for small values of γ. Prelec [1998] and Rieger and Wang [2006] offer two-parameter probability 
weighting functions that exhibits more flexibility than (5).19 The Prelec function is written as  
w(p) = exp{-η(-ln p)φ} (19) 
and is defined for 0<p<1, η>0 and 0< φ<1. Numerical problems may arise when φ→0, and when 
φ=0 this function is reduced to the Power function: 
w(p) = pη  (20) 
One solution to the numerical instability is to further generalize the function, and estimate a three-
parameter version that Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutström [2011] refer to as the Power-Prelec 
probability weighting function:  
w(p) = [ exp{-η(-ln p)φ} ] γ (21) 
                                                 
19 Harrison, Humphrey and Verschoor [2010] explore the applied use of these more flexible functional forms. 
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 Figure 5 displays the estimated Power-Prelec probability weighting function across sex, age 
groups and marital status. We generally observe that subjects have an inverse s-shaped function, 
except subjects between 30 and 40 years of age who have a strictly convex probability weighting 
function. Converting the convex probability weighting function into decision weights implies that the 
no-claims outcome is under-weighted and the four other outcomes with positive claims are over-
weighted, just like the Tversky-Kahneman function in equation (5). Hence, we observe that all 
households place a lower weight on the no-claims outcome and higher weights on outcomes with 
positive claims.  
 We can repeat the WTP estimations using the alternative probability weighting functions, and 
the results are shown in Table 7. Panel A displays the estimated WTP for auto insurance using the 
Power-Prelec function, and we find the same dramatic effect as before. The estimated WTP is 
between 300% and 600% higher than the actuarial value of the insurance claims. We find similar 
effects on estimated WTP for the two other types of insurance.20 The results thus point to a high 
WTP for auto, home and house insurance for all households.  
 We find that γ in the Power-Prelec function is significantly higher than 1 for subjects younger 
than 40 years of age, but the estimated coefficient is close to 1 and insignificant for all other 
households.21 Hence, the probability weighting functions are similar in shape for the Prelec and 
Power-Prelec functions. Finally, we find that the η parameter in the Power function is significantly 
higher than 1 for subjects below 40 years of age, and significantly lower than 1 for those who are 60 
years or older. We cannot reject the hypothesis that η=1 for men and women, and for singles and 
couples. A concave probability weighting function (η<1) implies that the no-claims outcome is over-
weighted and outcomes with positive claims are under-weighted, and we find that the estimated 
WTP for auto insurance falls below the actuarial value for the highest age group.  
 
7. Conclusions 
 We have shown that it is feasible to estimate the willingness to pay for insurance products. 
These estimates are based on claims data from the largest insurance company in Denmark, which is 
mapped to information at Statistics Denmark on annual household income and wealth, and 
nationally representative estimates of risk aversion and discount rates using controlled experiments. 
                                                 
20 These estimates are provided in Table A5 for home insurance and in Table A6 for house insurance. 
21 The estimated Prelec and Power probability weighting functions are displayed in Figure A1 and A2, respectively. 
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The results show that the willingness to pay is marginally higher than the actuarial fair value under 
Expected Utility Theory. However, the estimated willingness to pay is significantly higher under 
Rank-Dependent Utility Theory, and for some households it may be up to 600% higher than the 
actuarial value of the insurance claims.  
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Figure 1. Decision Weights under EUT and RDU 
 
 
Figure 2. Distribution of Auto Insurance Claims by Household Type 
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Figure 3. Distribution of Home Insurance Claims by Household Type 
 
Figure 4. Distribution of House Insurance Claims by Household Type 
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Figure 5. Probability Weighting: Power-Prelec Function 
 
 
Table 1. Estimates of Risk Preferences Assuming EUT 
 
 Standard  
 Estimate Error 95% Confidence Interval 
     
 Constant Relative Risk Aversion 
 
Average 0.73 0.045 0.64 0.81 
 
Men 0.69 0.051 0.59 0.79 
Women 0.76 0.039 0.69 0.84 
 
Younger than 30 years of age 0.82 0.058 0.71 0.93 
Between 30 and 40 years of age 0.76 0.078 0.60 0.91 
Between 40 and 50 years of age 0.88 0.057 0.77 0.99 
Between 50 and 60 years of age 0.85 0.070 0.71 0.99 
Older than 60 years of age 0.89 0.057 0.78 1.00 
     
Single 0.74 0.042 0.66 0.83 
Lives with spouse or partner 0.72 0.050 0.62 0.81 
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Table 2. Estimates of Risk Preferences Assuming RDU 
     
 CRRA Probability Weighting (γ) 
  Standard  Standard 
 Estimate Error Estimate Error 
     
Average 0.41 0.039 0.68 0.028 
 
Men 0.40 0.044 0.71 0.049 
Women 0.44 0.066 0.67 0.040 
 
Younger than 30 years of age 0.36 0.036 0.54 0.033 
Between 30 and 40 years of age 0.36 0.038 0.61 0.053 
Between 40 and 50 years of age 0.40 0.130 0.71 0.072 
Between 50 and 60 years of age 0.51 0.064 0.80 0.084 
Older than 60 years of age 0.22 0.094 0.62 0.053 
     
Single 0.40 0.071 0.61 0.039 
Lives with spouse or partner 0.41 0.040 0.70 0.032 
     
 
Table 3. Estimates of Time Preferences Assuming Exponential Discounting 
 
  Standard   
 Estimate Error 95% Confidence Interval 
     
 Discount Rate 
 
Average 0.101 0.0085 0.084 0.117 
 
Men 0.103 0.0105 0.083 0.124 
Women 0.099 0.0088 0.082 0.116 
 
Younger than 30 years of age 0.090 0.0126 0.065 0.115 
Between 30 and 40 years of age 0.092 0.0127 0.067 0.117 
Between 40 and 50 years of age 0.099 0.0116 0.076 0.121 
Between 50 and 60 years of age 0.102 0.0124 0.078 0.126 
Older than 60 years of age 0.121 0.0160 0.089 0.152 
     
Single 0.115 0.0120 0.091 0.138 
Lives with spouse or partner 0.097 0.0091 0.079 0.114 
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Table 4. Auto Insurance Claims and Willingness to Pay (Danish kroner) 
 
 Men Women Couples 
    
A. Average Insurance Claims 
 
Younger than 30 years of age 3,197 1,550 3,159 
Between 30 and 40 years of age 2,506 2,226 2,226 
Between 40 and 50 years of age 1,931 2,204 2,722 
Between 50 and 60 years of age 1,862 1,360 2,240 
Older than 60 years of age 1,153 1,137 1,637 
    
B. Willingness to Pay Assuming EUT 
    
Younger than 30 years of age 3,307 1,586 3,212 
Between 30 and 40 years of age 2,548 2,281 2,242 
Between 40 and 50 years of age 1,957 2,239 2,743 
Between 50 and 60 years of age 1,891 1,372 2,254 
Older than 60 years of age 1,163 1,145 1,650 
     
C. Willingness to Pay Assuming RDU 
     
Younger than 30 years of age  14,766 9,001 17,490 
  (1,597) (983) (1,728) 
Between 30 and 40 years of age  10,394 11,891 10,807 
  (1,330) (1,579) (1,297) 
Between 40 and 50 years of age  7,486 8,641 10,855 
  (1,185) (1,264) (1,509) 
Between 50 and 60 years of age  6,270 4,601 7,900 
  (1,087) (745) (1,232) 
Older than 60 years of age  5,108 5,257 8,762 
  (706) (668) (1,140) 
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Table 5. Home Insurance Claims and Willingness to Pay (Danish kroner) 
 
 Men Women Couples 
    
A. Average Insurance Claims 
 
Younger than 30 years of age 967 791 1,257 
Between 30 and 40 years of age 929 883 1,223 
Between 40 and 50 years of age 803 863 1,258 
Between 50 and 60 years of age 537 744 1,027 
Older than 60 years of age 358 344 676 
    
B. Willingness to Pay Assuming EUT 
    
Younger than 30 years of age 978 800 1,268 
Between 30 and 40 years of age 939 891 1,229 
Between 40 and 50 years of age 812 872 1,264 
Between 50 and 60 years of age 542 754 1,033 
Older than 60 years of age 363 352 683 
     
C. Willingness to Pay Assuming RDU 
     
Younger than 30 years of age  5,018 4,630 8,379 
  (624) (544) (977) 
Between 30 and 40 years of age  4,831 4,879 6,839 
  (725) (692) (911) 
Between 40 and 50 years of age  3,903 4,030 5,715 
  (728) (694) (891) 
Between 50 and 60 years of age  2,202 3,391 4,474 
  (446) (674) (814) 
Older than 60 years of age  2,742 3,186 5,578 
  (506) (566) (897) 
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Table 6. House Insurance Claims and Willingness to Pay (Danish kroner) 
 
 Men Women Couples 
    
A. Average Insurance Claims 
 
Younger than 30 years of age 1,732 1,758 2,226 
Between 30 and 40 years of age 2,518 1,997 2,680 
Between 40 and 50 years of age 1,351 1,901 2,475 
Between 50 and 60 years of age 1,298 1,916 2,101 
Older than 60 years of age 888 1,235 2,169 
    
B. Willingness to Pay Assuming EUT 
    
Younger than 30 years of age 1,786 1,784 2,248 
Between 30 and 40 years of age 2,582 2,033 2,704 
Between 40 and 50 years of age 1,365 1,930 2,494 
Between 50 and 60 years of age 1,311 1,941 2,115 
Older than 60 years of age 895 1,250 2,193 
     
C. Willingness to Pay Assuming RDU 
     
Younger than 30 years of age  11,147 8,450 12,329 
  (1,485) (829) (1,247) 
Between 30 and 40 years of age  12,387 10,221 13,444 
  (1,749) (1,330) (1,637) 
Between 40 and 50 years of age  5,678 8,018 10,431 
  (958) (1,234) (1,502) 
Between 50 and 60 years of age  4,461 6,712 7,827 
  (794) (1,105) (1,268) 
Older than 60 years of age  4,404 6,537 12,146 
  (657) (892) (1,606) 
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Table 7. Auto Insurance Claims and WTP using Power-Prelec, Power and Power Functions  
(Danish kroner) 
 Men Women Couples 
    
A. Power-Prelec Function 
    
Younger than 30 years of age 13,822 9,904 13,469 
 (2,364) (1,797) (2,067) 
Between 30 and 40 years of age 7,429 9,536 6,360 
 (1,541) (2,154) (1,213) 
Between 40 and 50 years of age 8,527 11,294 10,006 
 (1,412) (1,661) (1,309) 
Between 50 and 60 years of age 7,865 6,682 7,989 
 (1,489) (1,159) (1,216) 
Older than 60 years of age 4,782 5,758 6,644 
 (823) (907) (970) 
    
B. Prelec Function 
    
Younger than 30 years of age 15,143 10,021 14,046 
 (2,364) (1,656) (1,698) 
Between 30 and 40 years of age 8,992 10,830 7,323 
 (1,667) (2,182) (1,144) 
Between 40 and 50 years of age 8,545 10,346 9,505 
 (1,442) (1,574) (1,096) 
Between 50 and 60 years of age 7,238 5,623 7,014 
 (1,546) (1,125) (1,168) 
Older than 60 years of age 5,626 6,155 7,379 
 (1,012) (1,031) (1,029) 
  
C. Power Function
  
Younger than 30 years of age 4,033 1,900 3,734 
 (321) (154) (257) 
Between 30 and 40 years of age 3,145 2,755 2,635 
 (235) (208) (164) 
Between 40 and 50 years of age 1,964 2,187 2,586 
 (154) (173) (150) 
Between 50 and 60 years of age 1,993 1,412 2,240 
 (158) (112) (137) 
Older than 60 years of age 1,150 1,102 1,529 
 (90) (86) (86) 
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Willingness to Pay for Insurance in Denmark: Appendix 
 
Table A1. Annual Income After Tax in 2004 (Danish kroner) 
 Men Women Couples 
    
A. Customers with auto insurance 
 
Younger than 30 years of age 130,423 128,267 270,171 
Between 30 and 40 years of age 181,149 185,522 363,080 
Between 40 and 50 years of age 229,180 194,564 396,663 
Between 50 and 60 years of age 193,506 192,722 387,518 
Older than 60 years of age 166,626 168,351 295,759 
    
B. Customers with home insurance 
    
Younger than 30 years of age 129,807 115,809 249,004 
Between 30 and 40 years of age 179,684 174,773 362,881 
Between 40 and 50 years of age 218,262 184,303 402,477 
Between 50 and 60 years of age 191,900 191,900 391,802 
Older than 60 years of age 159,794 140,976 290,295 
     
C. Customers with house insurance 
     
Younger than 30 years of age  166,266 144,915 294,168 
Between 30 and 40 years of age  196,987 194,353 383,066 
Between 40 and 50 years of age  249,399 208,590 421,494 
Between 50 and 60 years of age  217,833 207,729 412,129 
Older than 60 years of age  189,422 166,478 317,122 
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Table A2. Private Financial Wealth in 2004 (Danish kroner) 
 Men Women Couples 
  
A. Customers with auto insurance 
 
Younger than 30 years of age 19,533 34,666 -60,094 
Between 30 and 40 years of age 100,187 68,855 67,420 
Between 40 and 50 years of age 367,952 238,806 328,811 
Between 50 and 60 years of age 491,470 581,935 768,707 
Older than 60 years of age 1,029,863 1,400,974 1,304,591 
  
B. Customers with home insurance 
    
Younger than 30 years of age 6,253 5,945 -48,253 
Between 30 and 40 years of age 85,398 43,978 67,353 
Between 40 and 50 years of age 311,785 175,551 327,180 
Between 50 and 60 years of age 384,695 418,451 738,979 
Older than 60 years of age 827,064 704,793 1,210,484 
     
C. Customers with house insurance 
     
Younger than 30 years of age  73,039 128,236 -109,879 
Between 30 and 40 years of age  182,632 249,629 113,315 
Between 40 and 50 years of age  570,648 501,402 426,223 
Between 50 and 60 years of age  756,115 914,765 915,569 
Older than 60 years of age  1,382,683 1,416,771 1,534,322 
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Table A3. WTP for Auto Insurance under EUT  
(Danish kroner) 
  Men Women Couples
A.      1-year planning period 
         
Younger than 30 years of age  5,693 2,072 3,765
Between 30 and 40 years of age  3,016 3,088 2,378
Between 40 and 50 years of age  2,215 2,611 2,922
Between 50 and 60 years of age  2,192 1,478 2,374
Older than 60 years of age  1,252 1,218 1,762
  
B.      2-year planning period 
         
Younger than 30 years of age  3,817 1,736 3,416
Between 30 and 40 years of age  2,715 2,517 2,298
Between 40 and 50 years of age  2,056 2,375 2,816
Between 50 and 60 years of age  2,001 1,415 2,304
Older than 60 years of age  1,199 1,175 1,695
  
C.      alpha = 0 
         
Younger than 30 years of age  3,306 1,585 3,213
Between 30 and 40 years of age  2,546 2,280 2,242
Between 40 and 50 years of age  1,955 2,236 2,742
Between 50 and 60 years of age  1,886 1,370 2,252
Older than 60 years of age  1,160 1,142 1,647
  
D.      r = 0.1 
         
Younger than 30 years of age  3,336 1,595 3,227
Between 30 and 40 years of age  2,558 2,294 2,246
Between 40 and 50 years of age  1,962 2,245 2,747
Between 50 and 60 years of age  1,894 1,373 2,256
Older than 60 years of age  1,163 1,144 1,650
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Table A4. WTP for Auto Insurance under RDU and TK Function 
(Danish kroner) 
  Men Women Couples
A.      1-year planning period 
         
Younger than 30 years of age  19,027 10,398 18,989
Between 30 and 40 years of age  11,404 14,059 11,204
Between 40 and 50 years of age  8,010 9,409 11,265
Between 50 and 60 years of age  6,871 4,838 8,179
Older than 60 years of age  5,309 5,437 9,076
  
B.      2-year planning period 
         
Younger than 30 years of age  15,867 9,466 18,061
Between 30 and 40 years of age  10,769 12,585 10,972
Between 40 and 50 years of age  7,692 8,933 11,025
Between 50 and 60 years of age  6,497 4,697 8,017
Older than 60 years of age  5,190 5,331 8,892
  
C.      alpha = 0 
         
Younger than 30 years of age  14,763 8,998 17,493
Between 30 and 40 years of age  10,389 11,886 10,806
Between 40 and 50 years of age  7,479 8,634 10,852
Between 50 and 60 years of age  6,260 4,596 7,896
Older than 60 years of age  5,101 5,250 8,753
  
D.     r = 0.1 
         
Younger than 30 years of age  14,831 9,029 17,531
Between 30 and 40 years of age  10,415 11,931 10,818
Between 40 and 50 years of age  7,495 8,655 10,865
Between 50 and 60 years of age  6,277 4,604 7,905
Older than 60 years of age  5,108 5,256 8,764
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Table A5. Home Insurance Claims and WTP using Power-Prelec, Power and Power 
Functions (Danish kroner) 
 Men Women Couples 
    
A. Power-Prelec Function 
    
Younger than 30 years of age 4,750 5,278 6,339 
 (962) (1,065) (1,142) 
Between 30 and 40 years of age 3,221 3,884 3,792 
 (797) (942) (797) 
Between 40 and 50 years of age 4,745 5,915 5,367 
 (951) (1,074) (775) 
Between 50 and 60 years of age 2,957 5,636 4,652 
 (675) (1,231) (821) 
Older than 60 years of age 2,717 4,121 4,199 
 (649) (947) (746) 
    
B. Prelec Function 
    
Younger than 30 years of age 5,301 5,350 6,675 
 (983) (980) (964) 
Between 30 and 40 years of age 4,066 4,463 4,449 
 (904) (971) (775) 
Between 40 and 50 years of age 4,758 5,310 5,063 
 (976) (997) (665) 
Between 50 and 60 years of age 2,678 4,546 3,989 
 (691) (1,152) (793) 
Older than 60 years of age 3,392 4,532 4,791 
 (852) (1112) (853) 
  
C. Power Function
  
Younger than 30 years of age 1,196 957 1,474 
 (94) (76) (100) 
Between 30 and 40 years of age 1,162 1,078 1,445 
 (87) (81) (90) 
Between 40 and 50 years of age 815 852 1,193 
 (64) (67) (69) 
Between 50 and 60 years of age 572 775 1,026 
 (46) (62) (63) 
Older than 60 years of age 359 337 632 
 (28) (27) (36) 
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Table A6. House Insurance Claims and WTP using Power-Prelec, Power and Power 
Functions (Danish kroner) 
 Men Women Couples 
    
A. Power-Prelec Function 
    
Younger than 30 years of age 10,514 9,063 9,486 
 (2,300) (1,448) (1,485) 
Between 30 and 40 years of age 8,453 8,236 7,829 
 (1,970) (1,815) (1,520) 
Between 40 and 50 years of age 6,620 10,770 9,645 
 (1,181) (1,675) (1,299) 
Between 50 and 60 years of age 5,662 9,797 7,954 
 (1,110) (1,715) (1,253) 
Older than 60 years of age 4,171 7,342 9,186 
 (782) (1,248) (1,361) 
    
B. Prelec Function 
    
Younger than 30 years of age 11,832 9,151 9,905 
 (2,354) (1,338) (1,225) 
Between 30 and 40 years of age 10,498 9,321 9,043 
 (2,181) (1,833) (1,438) 
Between 40 and 50 years of age 6,636 9,816 9,144 
 (1,209) (1,581) (1,096) 
Between 50 and 60 years of age 5,197 8,230 6,946 
 (1,148) (1,666) (1,207) 
Older than 60 years of age 4,978 7,886 10,220 
 (980) (1,426) (1,449) 
  
C. Power Function
  
Younger than 30 years of age 2,182 2,137 2,615 
 (175) (172) (179) 
Between 30 and 40 years of age 3,184 2,458 3,177 
 (240) (186) (199) 
Between 40 and 50 years of age 1,370 1,885 2,351 
 (108) (149) (137) 
Between 50 and 60 years of age 1,383 1,996 2,102 
 (109) (159) (129) 
Older than 60 years of age 885 1,202 2,031 
 (69) (94) (114) 
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Figure A1. Probability Weighting: Prelec Function 
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Figure A2. Probability Weighting: Power Function 
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